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This article examines the role played by global labour organizations in formulating a policy 
response to the global economic crisis. The global crisis that grew out of the contradictions 
and failure of existing hegemonic ideas meant that for the first time in several decades a 
possibility existed of rethinking the neoliberal economic strategy that has guided policy-
making in most of the world. The on-going crisis and the responses to it provide an occasion 
to revisit accounts of policy change and to reflect on the social forces stimulating change and 










This article examines the role played by global labour organizations2 in formulating a 
policy response to the global economic crisis. The global crisis that grew out of the 
contradictions and failure of existing hegemonic ideas meant that for the first time in several 
decades a possibility existed of challenging the neoliberal economic strategy that has guided 
policy-making in most of the world. The ongoing crisis and the evolving responses to it 
provide an occasion to revisit accounts of policy change and to reflect on the social forces 
stimulating change and those representing consolidation.  
According to the tenets of neoliberal economics, crises such as this were not supposed 
to happen (Stiglitz 2011). The initial reaction of states and international organizations was to 
suspend practice based on neoliberal theory and, instead, to engage in emergency reactions 
that included bailouts and de facto nationalization of banks and financial institutions. 
Significant public spending to sustain demand was also undertaken around the world in 
order to combat the crisis. A global recession, alleviated somewhat by these emergency 





recovery these policies were succeeded by austerity measures and a renewed assault on social 
program spending. 
 The situation remains unstable and subject to change. At Camp David on 19 May 
2012, G8 leaders called for a growth-led, rather than austerity-induced, path to economic 
recovery. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and the Trade Union 
Advisory Committee (TUAC) to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), two of the most important global labour organizations, welcomed 
the change in rhetoric but cautioned that states must strive to implement the growth-led 
path to recovery: ‘the G8 has turned away from austerity and depression and toward jobs and 
growth. The member countries now must take action to make the commitments at Camp 
David into reality’.3 On the other hand, according to its Finance Minister, Germany 
continued after the G8 meeting to position austerity as an essential pre-condition for growth: 
‘Fiscal consolidation is the precondition for our goal which is more growth’ (Globe and Mail, 
23 May 2012: B10). Indeed, within much of the European Union a new Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union had already been signed 
requiring, when ratified, national budgets to be in balance or in surplus. If a member state 
deviates from this rule, an automatic correction mechanism will be triggered. Those signing4 
agreed to incorporate the ‘balanced budget rule’ into national legislation, preferably at the 
constitutional level.5 This suggests the battle of ideas and economic strategies will be complex 
and that the technique of locking-in policy preferences to make them less susceptible to 
political change will be a continuing feature of the post-crisis neoliberal strategy. 
That capital, its organizations, and their sympathetic neoliberal political elites would 
seek a return to the status quo once the initial crisis had stabilized to a degree, or seek to use 
the crisis to further their long-standing agenda, should not be surprising. Yet there are other 
possible scenarios arising out of the post-crisis macroeconomic response. The first is a 
reversal of the pre-crisis orthodoxy and the establishment of some form of neo-Keynesianism 
involving more state spending and social and economic intervention and regulation. This 
would constitute a paradigm shift analogous to that which occurred in the 1970s when 
Keynesianism gave way to neoliberalism (Hall 1993). A second scenario describes a period of 
contestation, perhaps prolonged, in which an untidy hybrid of elements of neoliberalism and 
a neo-Keynesian alternative could be found in uneasy co-existence. Third, the neoliberal 
status quo might be restored. Finally, there might be an intensification of neo-liberalism with 
a renewed assault on the role of the state and the transfer of more of its authority to private 
markets.6 (In Chart 1 we schematically identify these respective scenarios; Chart 2 attempts 
to define the content of the neo-liberal and neo-Keynesian options). 
 

















Our focus on global labour, as a prospective source of alternative ideas to the 
prevailing neoliberal economic model, is stimulated by a policy change literature that 
suggests that dramatic changes in policy approach are associated with, though certainly not 
guaranteed by, crises (Kuhn 1962, Hall 1993). Ideational change is central to much of this 
literature, but the phenomenon of paradigm shift cannot be analyzed solely at the level of 
ideas, in terms of the superiority of one set of ideas over another. Hall (1993: 280) argued 
that the replacement of one paradigm by another will be as much a sociological or political 
phenomenon as a scientific one, and the outcomes are far from certain.7 There are 
operational difficulties in applying this approach to change. Vivien Schmidt (2011: 39) has 
observed that it can be difficult to know when paradigms have shifted and to understand 
why and how this has occurred.8 Most policy literature tends to emphasize policy continuity, 
or path-dependency, at the expense of a more nuanced account of the sudden shift in policy 
ideas and instruments (see for example Hacker 1998, Pierson 2000). The paradigm shift 
literature alerts us to the possibility of fundamental change that may sometimes occur, 
mostly under crisis conditions in which ideas play a key role.9  
In this article we identify global labour as a social actor that is potentially capable of 
developing an alternative to the current paradigm. We do not exaggerate its power or 
influence in the global arena but are mindful that it does have a variety of opportunities and 
strategies available to it. Key to these opportunities seems to be an expanding range of 
institutional access points, for instance via the G20.10 
At the level of ideas, neoliberalism is based on the promotion of expanded private 
markets and market relations, leading to great insecurity for labour, and systemic instability. 
Changes within the accumulation process associated with neoliberalism include the 
emergence of financialization and reliance on debt to stimulate (or simulate) prosperity, and 
an enhancement of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ and exploitation (Harvey 2008). This is 
typically accompanied by budgetary austerity (in the form of debt/deficit fixation, an end to 
demand management, and declining generosity of social programs), de/re-regulation both at 
home and in the international economy, and privatization in multiple dimensions. Together 
these state interventions reinforce the inegalitarian impact of markets and privilege the 
interests of capital over those of labour. 
 Schematically, this is represented in the following chart as a package of dimensions 
though, of course, the mutually reinforcing relationship between them is not captured by the 
chart. A fully developed alternative to neoliberalism would involve movement on all 
dimensions to the opposite side of the continuum. Less developed change, leading to the 
hybrid scenario outlined in Chart 1, might involve more limited movement along the 
continuum on all or some dimensions. We draw on these categories in analyzing global 
labour’s response to the crisis and in trying to determine whether those responses amount to 













Structural Weakness of Labour 
In seeking to influence events at the global level, labour faces the handicap that, over 
the course of the neoliberal era, the national foundations of global labour organizations have 
been significantly diminished. One indicator is union density, or the percentage of the 
labour force that is organized into unions. Chart 3 records declining union density in the 
OECD area for a forty-year period from 1975.  
 
 
Chart 3. Union membership, OECD Area, 1975-2007 
Source: OECD website: stats.oecd.org 
Chart 2. Schematic representation of Neoliberalism and a Neo-Keynesian alternative 
Neo-Keynesian paradigm Contested zone Neoliberal package 
Re/regulation   Privatization and 
deregulation 
Capital controls Capital mobility 
Managed trade Free trade 
Full-employment Inflation control 
Fiscal stimulus Fiscal consolidation and 
constraint 
State intervention to 
modify market outcomes; 
greater role in economic 
management 
State reinforces market 
outcomes 
Equalization  Market-driven inequality 
Employment protection 
and security 






Similarly, strikes as an expression of union power, have declined steadily over the 
same period. The OECD (2007) noted that: ‘In the OECD area, the strike rate has roughly 
halved in each decade since the early 1980s’. Politically the situation is no better. At various 
points in the past, the strength of labour’s political arm – socialist, communist and social 
democratic political parties – or its industrial arm, trade unions capable of being mobilized 
into mass or political action, was such that policies of concessions were pursued by economic 
elites and their right wing political counterparts. Indeed the social dialogue institutions in 
which labour is represented at the global level, the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
and the OECD’s TUAC, were products of precisely such calculations. However, labour’s 
great political forces of the last century are either disbanded or pale shadows of their former 
selves, as with the communist parties of western Europe; or else are ideologically thoroughly 
integrated into the prevailing paradigm, as with almost all social democratic parties. Few 
electoral vehicles carry global labour’s alternative paradigm at the national level. Recent anti-
austerity electoral results in France and Greece, and continued social unrest across much of 
Europe, suggest that labour may find new alliances in the post-crisis period. And as one 
senior ILO official notes, trade unions in the global south have sometimes been successful in 
building these broader alliances. ‘So you take a country like Brazil: they have always had a 
broader alliance, where [unions] have always been open to other social movements’ 
(confidential telephone interview, ILO official, 7 November 2012). 
The growing power of international financial capital, the pressure associated with 
shareholder profits, and a permissive regulatory environment favourable to international 
capital have permitted employers – especially multinational corporations – to call for more 
‘flexible’ labour markets and wage roll-backs while increasing profitability (Peters 2011: 75). 
A growing reliance on casual and temporary workers, coupled with a loss of union 
membership, has sent unions into decline and, in some cases (such as the Netherlands), led 
to the removal of union representatives from the governance boards of major corporations, 
thus diminishing certain types of co-determination and social dialogue and the space 
available for exerting labour influence (ibid: 83). There are exceptions to this trend, for 
example in Germany, and in the case of the European Works Councils (ECW) which have 
been strengthened by a 2009 European Commission amendment. These institutions 
arguably provide a small window of opportunity through which unions can influence 




Global Labour as a Potential Agent of Change 
Global labour continues to exist as an organised force even if its constituent parts are 
weakly institutionalized at the national level. Global labour has sought to build upon its 
long-standing efforts to shape the debates and practices surrounding work and employment 
(Lansbury, 2009: 331-3) by influencing current debates about the future of the global 
economy. This is a potentially important sphere of activity. The key entities are the 





OECD and the Global Union Federations (GUFs), representing a large share of global 
labour, and which interact with labour representatives at the International Labour 
Organization, through the ILO’s Bureau for Workers' Activities (ACTRAV).  
The ITUC, formed when the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) and World Confederation of Labour dissolved in November 2006, is now the 
world’s largest trade union body representing 175 million workers in 151 countries. Under 
the umbrella of the Council of Global Unions, itself established in 2007 as a means to 
generate greater coordination among global unions, ITUC has joined TUAC in several 
leading publications, including Exiting from the Crisis: Towards a Model of More Equitable 
and Sustainable Growth (European Trade Union Institute [ETUI] 2011). Exiting the Crisis 
builds on the ILO’s Decent Work agenda and provides a platform for the kind of 
paradigmatic changed envisioned by global labour. The Trade Union Advisory Committee 
has official consultative status with the OECD. TUAC was formed in the wake of the 
European Recovery Programme (the Marshall Plan) in 1948 as an interface between trade 
unions and the OECD. Through its 58 national trade unions centres representing 66 million 
workers, TUAC has more recently coordinated labour input into the G8 summits and acted 
on a variety of issues related to labour market policy across OECD states. Since the crisis the 
G20 has become a more important forum for TUAC (confidential telephone interview, 
TUAC official, 25 July 2012). Together ITUC and TUAC bring considerable institutional 
resources through their formal associations with the ILO and OECD, but they also 
command a significant degree of influence through affiliated national level unions bridging 
North and South.  
Hennebert and Bourque (2011) provide a useful if schematic account of ways that 
global labour strategically responded to the global economic crisis: as insiders working within 
international institutions like the ILO and OECD; as outsiders exerting influence through 
research and activism largely beyond the workings of the ILO and OECD; and in their 
lobbying for labour clauses in free trade agreements. Here we focus on the insider and 
outsider strategies,11 and, in each of the following sections, document labour’s strategy 
followed by an analysis of the degree of change to the dominant neo-liberalism that it 
represents and an assessment of how much impact it has had.  
The insider/outsider distinction is analytically useful, but we recognize that it may 
overlook the way global labour actually works through balancing and interacting between 
insider and outsider positions. As one global labour official put it: ‘we need to do both…You 
can bring a very powerful message by being inside an institution, but the reason we get as far 
as we do, in many countries and cases, is because they are worried about unions’ strength in 




Global Unions as Insiders in International Organizations 
Global unions are represented on two major international organizations: the OECD 





employers, labour) International Labour Organization. Unsurprisingly they seek to take 
advantage of these positions to influence emerging global policy.  
The International Labour Organization was founded in 1919 as a response to the 
social tensions triggered by war and revolution. It was designed to ‘address workers’ interests 
within the confines of the modern capitalist labour market’ (Vosko 2000: 20) and thus 
focused on the amelioration of capitalism’s effects rather than its replacement. The ILO is 
committed to social dialogue; from its inception the organization was tripartite, being 
composed of representatives of business, labour and government. Similar to the OECD, the 
ILO positions itself as an organization responsible for the development and dissemination of 
expert knowledge and common standards achieved through voluntary agreements, though 
with few enforcement mechanisms beyond moral suasion. During the Great Depression, the 
ILO did take a stance in attempting to devise global social policy responses to the global 
financial, economic and employment crisis by pushing for internationally coordinated public 
works schemes to create jobs (Endres and Fleming 1996, Hughes and Howarth 2012). 
However, its record in recent decades has been less impressive: failing to resist US pressures 
to adopt the 1990s orthodoxy of the neoliberal Washington consensus, undergoing 
encroachment from more robust international organizations like the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, and taking refuge in populist formulae12 (Standing 2010). 
Nevertheless, it was not unreasonable to hope that the ILO might recover some of its former 
role as a generator of alternative responses to crisis. Hughes and Haworth (2010: 43) point 
out that the ILO’s origins, structure (tripartite and based on social dialogue), and traditions 
lend themselves not to radicalism but rather to ‘challenge policy settings and outcomes’ 
within the capitalist system. Its expert research on employment and labour market matters 
and earlier identification of a looming crisis has clearly resulted in enhanced prestige and 
recognition from the G20 (Hughes and Haworth 2012).  
The ITUC/TUAC/GU task force publication, Exiting from the Crisis, conceives of 
the ILO’s Global Jobs Pact as a ‘prescription for recovery:’ a social protection floor, 
combined with minimum wage guarantees and collective bargaining rights forms the basis 
for income-led growth (ETUI 2011: 111). The Global Jobs Pact, which resulted from the 
98th session of the ILO in June 2009, suggested the ILO could indeed devise a global social 
policy response to contemporary crisis. Reflecting the tripartite framework between 
governments and labour/employer organizations, the Jobs Pact proposed to deal with the 
global recession by drawing on social dialogue to achieve an internationally agreed upon set 
of labour policies that seek to minimize the gap between economic recovery and employment 
recovery. The Jobs Pact was (and is) an attempt to use a core set of international labour 
standards to stem the flow of wage cuts (see ILO 2011: 210). It outlines a set of principles 
and a portfolio of recommended policies from which individual countries could create a 
package suitable to its own priorities, but which would be designed to put ‘full and 
productive employment and decent work at the heart of the crisis responses’ (ILO 2009: 5). 
Unsurprisingly the recommendations and principles are cast at high level of generality. 
 The Pact draws on the ILO’s earlier Decent Work agenda – itself a rather vague 





woman ‘promoted through aid, development and investment measures.’ Decent Work is 
measured by four strategic objectives:  
 
1. International labour standards that guarantee worker and workplace rights; 
2. Employment and income opportunities through demand-led growth underpinned by 
macro-economic counter-cyclical policies; vocational and education policies that 
contribute to the growth of ‘green’ jobs; 
3. Social protection and social security (e.g., through policies that extend and prolong 
EI coverage); 
4. Social dialogue and tripartism.13 
 
The integrated approach of the ILO Global Jobs Pact remains the core apparatus of an 
income-led growth model around which global unions are structuring much of their joint 
activity. This is a sphere of activity where global labour organizations like ITUC can make an 
identifiable contribution. Essentially, the strategy is to capitalize on the legitimacy and 
resources of a tripartite institution like the ILO to make gains that may otherwise be 
unachievable. The ILO houses the Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV), a technical 
department that plays a central role in building and strengthening union capacity through 
research and networking. ACTRAV officials played a role in shaping the ILO’s response to 
the global economic crisis by promoting public investment policies favourable to a growth-
led strategy (confidential telephone interview, ILO official, 7 November 2012). ACTRAV’s 
union outreach coupled with its close proximity to the ILO Governing Body means that 
global labour can influence ILO policy.  
As a case in point, ACTRAV and ITUC officials gathered in Lomé, Togo in March 
2012 to put into motion elements of the ILO’s Decent Work agenda in Africa.14 These 
elements chiefly revolve around establishing a social protection floor in countries where 
public health issues like HIV/AIDS intersect with campaigns to promote decent work, in 
particular for domestic and precarious workers. Ultimately, in this ‘insider’ capacity, the 
ITUC operates within the ILO’s mandate for global policy shift – here focusing on one of 
the ITUC’s overlapping priorities, precarious work – while drawing on resources like 
ACTRAV for support in implementing local policy goals. In turn, ITUC affiliates across the 
world help to deploy the ILO’s Decent Work agenda in context-specific ways that may 
appeal to the real economic difficulties facing certain locales, thus boosting the ILO’s 
presence and relevance. Rather than challenging the forces of economic globalization 
directly, the ITUC’s work in sub-Saharan Africa is a good example of how global labour 
strategy works to overturn specific conditions that hamper worker rights, collective 
bargaining, and decent living. 
The ITUC has also been consulting closely on important ILO publications. Social 
Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalization (ILO 2011b) endorses the earlier Jobs 
Pact document and echoes themes driving the current global labour agenda: promoting the 
guaranteed access to national universal health care; basic income security for the weak, 





the ITUC’s role in this multilateral effort, it is evident that the ILO consults with global 
labour to develop a more socially-inclusive and economically-dynamic development model 
that forms the basis of a more ‘inclusive’ globalization (ibid: ix).  
However, the fact that ILO documents are the product of tripartite discussion in 
which the other partners have mostly been on the side of neoliberal political economy means 
that the creation of an alternative vision is limited by the nature of labour’s partners. The 
level of generality in which documents like the Jobs Pact are formulated, together with the 
range of options contained within the document, and the fact it is dependent on states for 
implementation, means that differences between the partners are somewhat camouflaged. As 
one ILO official noted, ‘there’s always a value in cooperating, but there’s also a value in a 
plurality of ideas. One of the reasons why the crisis of 2008 came as such a shock and 
surprise was that there was a kind of monopoly on interpreting how the economy should be 
structured’ (confidential telephone interview, ILO official, 7 November 2012). 
 Because of its technical expertise on global labour issues, the ILO remains an 
important venue for the voice of global labour. Indeed, Decent Work forms the basis of a 
coordinated effort by the ITUC and TUAC to shape a future global economic order. Labour 
enjoys structured access to the ILO, and cooperation between ACTRAV and ITUC affiliates 
around the world help anchor socially-inclusive development models. Yet discontent persists. 
Although the Council of Global Unions played a pivotal role in bringing the ILO and the 
Jobs Pact to the April 2009 G20 Labour Ministers’ summit, there were concerns within the 
Council that the summit had too much of a feeling of ‘business as usual’.15  
 Institutional configuration based on dialogue and negotiation with social partners in 
business and government produces contradictions for labour. The need to adopt consensus 
documents limits the scope of the agenda that can be pursued through the ‘insider’ strategy. 
Yet, paradoxically these institutional spaces may permit global labour the access it needs to 
push for lasting change to the global economic system. The TUAC, for example, is able to 
parlay its access to the OECD and to high-level meetings at the G20 to forward policy 
concerns from its labour partners in the Global South. Moreover, consultative status inside 
the OECD does not preclude cooperation with labour outside the organization and the 
development of criticism of the OECD (confidential telephone interview, TUAC official, 25 
July 2012).  
In that sense one question for global labour is whether it can more effectively bring 
about a plurality of ideas conducive to promoting a more equitable global economy outside 
its established positions in the ILO and OECD. 
  
  
Global Unions as Outsiders: Pressuring International Organizations  
Global labour has attempted to lobby other international fora it views as having a key 
role in developing responses to the crisis. This has led to some demonstrable success. The 
ITUC, for instance, claims it has been able to persuade the G20 to include public 






Well, to start with at every G20 summit certainly from London onwards there 
was an improvement in the conclusions of the G20 declaration and 
communiqués which was due to our lobbying. Even in the worst ones, which 
from our perspective was the one in 2010, those G20 communiqués included 
quite good paragraphs on the first page, let’s say, about employment, which we 
know at the start of the meetings were not even there at all, or at the end of the 
text. We’ve been able to get them to prioritize employment and to put there in a 
very positive point of view – not jobs at any cost, they’re talking about quality 
employment, good jobs and decent work (confidential telephone interview, 
ITUC official, 17 July 2012). 
 
This personal account from an ITUC official reveals the lobbying processes through which 
global labour has been able to advance a core policy structured on the ILO’s Decent Work 
agenda. Global unions work through ‘task forces’ on issues related to employment with 
ministerial delegates to the G20. These task forces tend to be the result of informal meetings 
between union officials and ministerial representatives (confidential telephone interview, 
TUAC official, 25 July 2012). The G20 task forces also include representatives from TUAC 
and the Global Union Federations (GUFs). It is clear, therefore, that a harmonized effort 
between the ITUC, TUAC and other labour partners is brought to bear on the G20 both 
formally – especially through G20 communiqués – and also informally via networks 
generated by a set of common issue areas. 
 Indeed, for our purposes it is not necessary to separate the priorities and 
perspectives of the individual labour groups (ITUC, TUAC, the Global Unions) because 
many of the statements from the labour groups are joint statements. For instance, the 
majority of ITUC statements are joint statements with at least the TUAC; and almost all of 
the TUAC statements are ‘in partnership’ with the ITUC and Global Unions. An 
examination of  ITUC and TUAC documents (ITUC 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013; 
TUAC 2008, 2009, 2010, 2013) from 2008 onwards reveals the articulation of a broadly 
Keynesian or neo-Keynesian response to the crisis as a conscious alternative to a paradigm 
depicted as being supportive of ‘unfettered financial markets and...self regulation’ (ITUC 
2008). In the context of the crisis, early documents accepted the need for governments to 
recapitalize the banks while simultaneously criticizing the socialization of private sector debt 
that was involved. Later documents switched to an emphasis on reforms to financial 
governance in order to make such crises impossible in the future. The need for fiscal 
stimulus, rather than consolidation or austerity, was a common feature of labour declarations 
and is nicely encapsulated in a TUAC (2008: 3-4) statement calling for increases in aggregate 
demand ‘of sufficient magnitude to revitalize the real economy: employment, wages, and 
household disposable incomes’. Such formulations indicate that at least in the current period 
global labour espouses a classic Keynesian view of  unemployment.  
 As a corollary, the continued attachment of some international organizations, the 
OECD and IMF amongst them, to structural explanations of labour market problems (such 





spending under the rubric of a social protection floor is endorsed. A more interventionist and 
regulatory role for the state is part of this vision, but as much emphasis is placed on the 
reform of global governance institutions. The IMF and other organizations are singled out 
for criticism while the ILO is endorsed and its expertise in labour matters, global labour 
argues, should be recognized and utilized. At the same time, labour has called for inclusion in 
global governance organizations wherever important economic decisions are being made.  
 These declarations by global labour, often in chorus, suggest a gradual movement 
toward themes identified with the neo-Keynesian alternative in Chart 2. There remains 
subtle omissions. Declarations by global labour place comparatively less emphasis on 
privatization, capital controls (except where finance is concerned), and the free trade system. 
As noted below, the relative inattention to these issues is problematic in that the 
combination of mobility of goods, services and capital, in a context of increased 
privatization, has proved disadvantageous for labour throughout the neoliberal period. 
Addressing these issues might be fundamental to re-instituting a form of Keynesianism. 
Nevertheless, global labour has articulated a form of Keynesianism that presents an 
alternative to the neoliberal paradigm associated with the crisis. 
For example, at the 2010 congress of the ITUC a resolution on ‘Changing 
Globalisation’ articulated similar themes calling for the rejection of neoliberalism and for 
fundamental change (ITUC 2010). Part of this was a call for the implementation of the 
ILO’s Global Jobs Pact as part of a rebalancing between labour and capital. Similarly, ITUC 
advocated ‘fundamental reform in the internal governance of intergovernmental 
organisations, especially the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to improve the 
representation of developing countries and guarantee full democracy, transparency and 
consultation in their decision-making processes’. The document reiterated the need for 
working people to ‘have a seat at the table’ through a formal trade union advisory role. It also 
recognized that the neoliberal ideology of these international organizations was partly 
responsible for the crisis, that their mandates needed to be changed, and proposed a leading 
role for the ILO (ITUC 2010: 2). There was some analysis of the role of multilateral and 
regional trade and investment agreements and suggested reforms to these to protect public 
services and eliminate protectionist measures against developing countries. 
In 2011 the Global Unions, comprising the ITUC, the sectoral Global Unions 
Federations and the TUAC presented a statement to the 2011 meetings of the IMF and 
World Bank. Recognizing that previous appeals had fallen on deaf ears and that the IFIs were 
leading the drive to fiscal consolidation, or austerity (reversion to the neoliberal status quo or 
its intensification – see Chart 1), the unions sharpened their criticism of the role played by 
the IFIs. The statement called on them to defer to the ILO in labour market matters, rather 
than urging labour market flexibility on states, renewed calls for a financial transactions tax, 
and to ‘demonstrate a decisive break with the failed “Washington Consensus” policy 
paradigm’.16 
 These views were further developed in Exiting the Crisis, a publication emanating 





providing an alternative to the prevailing economic paradigm of ‘market fundamentalism’ 
(ETUI 2011: 20). This initiative recognizes the failure of labour’s earlier attempts to impress 
on international organizations and national governments the need to maintain stimulus 
measures to offset the risk of a double dip recession or full blown depression: ‘A dramatic 
swing in the direction of state action has been swiftly followed by an equal and opposite 
clamour for immediate fiscal consolidation....austerity policies are back with a vengeance’ 
(ibid: 22). After the rather modest statement that working people require ‘a voice in 
determining their futures’, the document goes on to outline a program based on full 
employment, rising incomes and labour standards for developing countries, an 
environmentally sustainable economic growth model, and greater income equality as a route 
to greater social cohesion (ibid: 23). 
 It was already clear by 2010 at the international and national level that whatever 
enthusiasm may have existed for employment-led crisis recovery plans generated through 
these cooperative arrangements had dampened. Support for expanding stimulus programs to 
accommodate a jobs-led growth plan was met with entrenched political opposition. One 
senior ITUC official appraised the situation in this way: ‘But then I think we can say starting 
in 2010, and this was really confirmed at the Toronto summit in June of 2010, that [job 
creation initiatives] were essentially scaled back and governments did an about-face and put 
the emphasis on fiscal consolidation, i.e., deficit reduction’ (confidential telephone interview, 
ITUC official, 17 July 2012). After a brief movement in the direction of Keynesian stimulus 
policies, government and international organizations reverted to, and in some cases 
intensified, their attachment to neoliberalism (see Charts 1 and 2). 
In this context, the rather vague Jobs Pact made little headway against arguments that 
prompted a return to the ‘comforting nostrums of economic orthodoxy’ (ETUI 2011). 
Austerity measures were widely and swiftly enacted to reduce government deficits. Even 
states like Germany cut deficits rather than adopting counter-cyclical measures to buffer the 
effects of recession.  
Although the Jobs Pact was endorsed by the ITUC’s 2nd General Congress in 
Vancouver in 2010, it was described by the Council of Global Unions as falling short of 
expectations. The ILO itself has conceded its proposals have been largely ineffective:  
 
Among the countries that responded to the crisis, only limited elements of the 
proposals in the Global Jobs Pact were adopted. One focus was on infrastructure 
investment, but without much effort to make this employment-intensive. Some 
countries saw an increase in social dialogue, but more in an attempt to calm 
down workers than to actually find collectively agreed solutions. In terms of 
labour standards, the crisis intensified the discussion, but few concrete changes 
have materialized thus far (ILO 2011: 64). 
 
The ‘insider’ strategy and incorporation of some of its elements into ‘outsider’ 
strategies therefore presents a dilemma for labour. If the ILO is to champion a new global 






partners: labour, government and business. This implies a degree of moderation and 
compromise that may produce vague and general documents that only partially reflect the 
aspirations of labour. And, as with the Global Jobs Pact, it still may prove ineffective as far as 
implementation is concerned. Yet, it is also true that the ILO has achieved some recognition 
at the G20 for its contributions to labour research and program development. The 
organization gets occasional mention in communiqués of the G20 Leaders and Finance 
Ministers, whilst the ITUC and TUAC are not mentioned at all. In G20 Labour Ministers’ 
communiqués the ILO is repeatedly cited and ILO conventions are often supported. 
Stepping outside the insider constraint presents its own dilemmas. Proposals can be 
somewhat more radical, but they also run the risk of being ignored. In Getting the World to 
Work (Global Union Federation 2009), global labour attempted to come to grips with the 
question: how can trade unions mobilize a policy vision to deal with mass global 
unemployment and other issues related to public welfare that goes beyond ‘tinkering with 
regulation and repairing broken models of free trade’? As a collection of voices representing 
the global trade union leadership, the document’s centrepiece is an abridged version of the 
London Declaration, a statement prepared for presentation to the London G20 summit in 
April 2009. The Declaration warned ‘[without] a radical response by governments and 
international institutions the unemployment crisis will be transformed into a social and, 
ultimately, political crisis’.17  
 Priorities set out in the Declaration included a new governance structure for global 
economic trade, a new economic model for the creation of jobs, tighter rules for controlling 
global financial markets, and a green growth agenda. The goal is a new economic order 
governed by tighter financial market regulation and employment-based policies designed to 
get people working. The Council of Global Unions wants leaders of G20 nations to develop 
and maintain a political agenda around making social issues just as salient as economic ones. 
Calling for a ‘paradigm shift in policy making’ (London Declaration: 3), the global unions 
focused on a new global architecture to control financial markets, a new economic 
development model, and an end to policies that had polarized income distribution in recent 
decades. This thrust was to be operationalized through a five point plan consisting of a co-
ordinated international recovery and sustainable growth plan focused on job creation: public 
investment and social protection for the most needy; nationalization of banks that are 
insolvent and establish new rules and machinery of governance to control global finance; 
extending the role of collective bargaining to offset the risk of wage deflation and reverse 
income inequality; policies to promote environmental sustainability and green growth; and 
establishing a ‘legal benchmark of norms and instruments of the international economic and 
social institutions –  the ILO, IMF, World Bank, WTO, and the OECD’ (ibid: 3). While 










Documents emerging from the outsider track of labour’s strategy are clearly more 
radical that those developed in the insider track. However, in a number of aspects these ideas 
are also quite limited and reflect the prevailing orthodoxy. There are very real constraints 
imposed by the insider strategy as well. On trade, for example, the incorporation of workers’ 
rights and recognition of the legitimacy of limited capital controls by developing countries 
hardly reverses the power asymmetries embedded in the global trading system (see Wilkinson 
2011). Similarly, the proposal to use international organizations’ norms and decisions as 
some sort of enforceable legal benchmark fails to recognize the degree to which these 
organizations have reflected and even instigated the neoliberal paradigm. While the proposal 
that working people have a ‘seat at the table’ (London Declaration: 10) in the new global 
institutions would be an advance on the existing situation, the analogy with the role played 
by the TUAC at the OECD is hardly encouraging as, notwithstanding the valuable role 
played by the TUAC in other contexts, it is largely marginalized within the inner sanctums 
of the OECD. Similarly, the call for the ILO to be ‘at the centre of a new multilateral 
architecture that can respond effectively to the current crisis in market-driven globalisation 
by placing employment, social priorities and the promotion of decent work at the heart of 
decision-making’ (p.10) is aspirational but does not confront the organizational and political 
inadequacies of the ILO as articulated by critics such as Guy Standing (2008).  
According to Standing, the ILO’s focus on ‘soft law’ and norms-based conventions to 
the detriment of bridging labour inequality led to the organization’s progressive 
marginalization from core labour market issues even as it continued to seek enhanced access 
to other institutional circles, for example at the G20 in 2009. For Standing, the Decent 
Work agenda at the heart of the ILO’s 1999 platform falls short of a vision for global labour; 
instead, the concept leaves ‘too much room for flabby platitudes’ open to challenge by bodies 
like the International Organization of Employers. ‘The organisation has retreated into a non-
confrontational mode that sidelines equality while espousing the vagueness of “decency,” 
“fairness” and “dialogue”.18 The trouble is that if the ILO cannot address, and does not wish 
to address, the ideological issues...it is unclear what role it can play’ (Standing 2008: 356-7, 
368-70). 
Clearly, global labour’s objectives run counter to the outcomes of the prevailing 
neoliberal model. Yet, despite the radical aspiration to develop an alternative, there are 
indications that key ingredients of the neoliberal model are either poorly understood or at 
least not emphasized as part of the package for paradigm change. This leaves global labour’s 
alternative looking less than fully developed and showing some signs of being in the hybrid 
location identified in Chart 1 or the Contested Zone of Chart 2. Examples include the 
failure to fully confront the implications of the architecture of the international trading and 
investment system (for accounts that identify problems see Van Harten 2005, McBride 
2006, Wilkinson 2011).19 One explanation for labour’s lack of emphasis on these issues is 
that they no longer feature on the agenda of the organizations labour is seeking to influence, 
and are simply a reflection of priorities in a crisis situation.20 Similarly, there is a selective 





labour enjoys representation. This is reflected in acceptance of, for example, the OECD 
(2006) rethink of its Jobs Strategy (for a more critical analysis see McBride, McNutt and 
Williams 2008).21 In another example, the implications for labour of the OECD’s long-
standing promotion of capital mobility (see Williams 2008) are rarely mentioned while 
efforts are made to promote and reference the OECD Guidelines on Multinational 
Enterprises, which are recommendations and not legally enforceable (OECD 2011: 4).  
In terms of effectiveness, however, it is also clear that labour’s structural weaknesses 
precluded its message from making much headway in the forums it chose to influence. 
Unsurprisingly, the G20 Labour Ministers proved more receptive than their Finance 
Minister counterparts. High profile communiqués issued by the G20 leaders (G20 Leaders 
2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012) on issues related to unemployment, job 
creation, and society’s most vulnerable, may reflect the influence of labour’s lobbying efforts. 
Yet they were modified by the advice from the Finance Ministers, which, from 2009 
emphasized a reduction of stimulus, fiscal consolidation, deficit reduction, reduction of debt-
to-GDP ratios, structural labour market reforms, and measures to buttress investor 
confidence. In terms of Charts 1 and 2, neoliberal orthodoxies were being re-asserted and, as 
in the case of European peripheral states, intensified under the direction of the Trioika (the 
European Central Bank, European Commission, and the IMF) or autonomously as under 
the coalition government in the UK. 
The crisis represented an opening and an opportunity for discussion of alternatives to 
the prevailing paradigm that has served labour, at least in the developed world, so ill over the 
past thirty years. But the opportunity found labour at a considerable disadvantage. Paradigm 
change implies both a set of alternative ideas and social forces strong enough to contend on 
behalf of new ideas with those backing the old. The durability of the neoliberal globalization 
project has little to do with the power of its ideas – increasingly these are exposed as 
threadbare – but rather in the power of the bloc of state and social forces that promote and 
benefit from it. Jessop (2012: 27) notes: ‘Powerful narratives without powerful bases from 
which to implement them are less effective than...accounts that are pursued consistently by 
the powerful through the de facto exercise of power’. This means that debates over 
alternatives hardly take place on a level playing field. This judgement certainly fits the case of 
global labour’s efforts to devise an alternative to the neoliberal paradigm. 
 Labour is structurally weak after decades of neoliberal globalization. Its industrial 
strength, as measured by union density, has steadily declined for a protracted period. Its 
political allies are either ineffective or thoroughly integrated into the dominant paradigm. 
There remain areas of strength, and other opportunities for influence though works councils 
and other mechanisms of social dialogue and co-determination. Yet the impact of these 
remains limited and, perhaps more importantly from the point of view of broader paradigm 
change, there are no discernible divisions in the ranks of capital which could serve as the 
basis for cross-class alliances or compromises. Capital remains remarkably united around the 
main principles of neoliberalism and it is unclear at this juncture what, if any, new alliances 






However, from a position of structural weakness labour has clearly sought to take 
advantage of the opportunities it does have available to it. In promoting alternative ideas to 
resolve the crisis on terms more favourable to labour, we have focused on two principal 
strategies. The first has been to try and influence policy positions and advice provided by 
international organizations, the ILO and OECD, in which labour, as a result of its strength 
in previous eras, enjoys representation. A second strategy has been to lobby global 
organizations like the IMF, G8 and G20 – organizations that are making decisions and 
recommendations that have a major effect on the course and outcome of the crisis.  
The first strategy involves promotion of the claims of the ILO and, to a lesser extent 
the OECD, to be taken seriously, listened to, and perhaps structurally incorporated more 
effectively in the global governance architecture. The approach is beset with contradictions. 
Labour does have influence in these organizations, though arguably very limited in the case 
of the OECD which routinely recommends policies hostile to labour interests, as with the 
flexibility theme of the Jobs Strategy. Even within the ILO, labour is a minority voice and 
the achievement of pronouncements favouring labour rights is surrounded by vague language 
and non-enforceability.  
 As outsiders lobbying the powerful, global labour has promoted alternative ideas, 
though these are sometimes rendered excessively cautious by a felt need to build upon what 
was achieved in its capacity as an insider. Thus, for example, the ILO’s Global Jobs Pact 
features in many labour policy statements despite its vagueness and moderation. 
Over time, as the crisis has developed, global labour’s rhetoric became more radical 
and included calls for paradigm change. Although the proposed changes were sometimes 
significant – such as more stimulus spending, more protection of labour and social rights, 
more controls on finance – these changes in reality do not add up to a fundamental rejection 
of the neoliberal paradigm, nor a comprehensive alternative to it. This is especially clear in 
the treatment of trade and investment agreements that, outside demands for stricter 
regulation of finance, leaves intact the combination of capital mobility and free trade that has 
been so lethal to the interests of labour in the neoliberal era. Global labour officials are 
acutely aware of the need for pressure on governments from organized labour and its allies if 
alternative proposals are to make any headway. And the strategies labour has used are 
sometimes depicted in a Gramscian sense as a struggle for hegemony:  
 
organized labour, political movements, and critical academic research and 
thinking, and also media and journalism [are involved in] trying to change the 
hegemonic discourse…the ILO has the opportunity to bring some arguments 
for…the kind of macroeconomic policies conducive to growth, which we can 
bring into the debate…it’s a complex process and you need alliances 
(confidential telephone interview, ILO official, 7 November 2012). 
 
The neoliberal project is, of course, more than a policy paradigm. It is a capital 
accumulation strategy designed to fix problems encountered by capital. Labour and its social 





defence of the pre-neoliberal order. It is, of course, possible that successive rounds of 
austerity and coercion will galvanize these social forces, but presently they seem too weak to 
displace capital from its dominant position in contemporary society, and it is many years 
since any hint surfaced that this was their goal. Nor, since the demise of Keynesianism, has 
anyone constructed a new ‘middle way’ in which capital’s self-defined accumulation needs, 
or those of some fraction of capital, could be reconciled with a more just and secure social 
order, even though the numerous benefits of the attributes of such a society, such as equality, 
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4.  All members except the UK and the Czech Republic. 
 
5.  Meanwhile part of the intellectual case for austerity was undermined with the revelation 
that a widely cited and influential article had simply got its numbers wrong and the posited 
effects on growth of public debt reaching a tipping point at 90 percent of GDP had been 
vastly exaggerated. Yet this exposure had little impact on those committed to austerity 







6.  As Dean Baker (2011) and others have pointed out, counterposing state and markets in 
this way can be misleading as neoliberals also rely on the state, but for different purposes 
than their Keynesian predecessors. 
 
7.  Blyth (2001: 2) makes the case that times of uncertainty, such as economic crises, are not 
resolved purely by structural forces. Ideas matter, and path dependence can be an ideational 
as well as an institutional phenomenon. Thus dominant ideas define what is possible and, 
until successfully challenged and displaced, are likely to resemble or build upon the status 
quo – even if such ideas and policies and those based on them make literally ‘no sense’ (Blyth 
2001: 24). 
 
8.  For a sophisticated review of the literature on policy paradigms and paradigm shifts see 
Skogstad and Schmidt, 2011. 
 
9.  This is not to deny, as Mark Blyth (2001:2) has pointed out, that the battle of ideas can 
just as easily lead to continuity and reinforcement of dominant paradigms as to their 
replacement. Still, his conceptualization of economic ideas as ‘institutional blueprints during 
periods of uncertainty, as weapons in distributional struggles, and as “cognitive locks”’ 
usefully leads, in our view, to a simultaneous emphasis on the social forces espousing ideas, as 
well as on the ideas themselves. 
 
10.  Global union officials contrasted the more positive outcomes they had achieved at the 
G20 with the less successful attempts to influence the European Commission (confidential 
telephone interview, ITUC official, 12 July 2012). 
 
11.  Though we note in passing that the inclusion of social or labour clauses hardly 
represents an effective response to the challenges that neoliberal trade and investment 
agreements pose to labour’s interests and thus leave labour badly positioned in terms of 
developing an alternative paradigm.  
 
12.  Defined by Standing (2010: 314) as  leaving ‘structures in place while developing a 
rhetoric that is non-threatening to powerful interests while seeming to be on the side of the 
poor, vulnerable and disadvantaged’. 
 
13.  See ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--
en/index.htm. 
 
14. See ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/actrav/info/pr/WCMS_178680/lang--
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16. ‘The IFIs and G20 Must Lead a Global Action Plan to Prevent a New Surge in 
Unemployment’. Accessed online at 
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17.  Getting the World to Work, p. 23 
 
18.  For a review of various critiques of the ILO, including that of Standing, see Haworth 
and Hughes, 2011: Ch.8. 
 
19.  Another example is the role of central bank independence (which is unlikely to be much 
moderated by the proposal to require them to engage in structured dialogue with other social 
forces, besides finance, which arguably enjoys privileged access under conditions of central 
bank independence). 
 
20.  One of our interviewees (confidential telephone interview, ITUC official, 17 July 2012) 
did outline a global labour agenda beyond inclusion of social clauses in trade agreements. It 
included support for greater controls on capital mobility including a Tobin tax, opposition 
to certain types of intellectual property rights, and defending developing countries’ 
sovereignty to adopt industrial policies. However, in the present context it does not receive 
much public profile. 
 
21.  An explanation could be that the rethink did represent progress when compared to the 
original strategy against which global labour organizations had waged a long campaign. And 
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